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The residential real estate market has been playing an important role in the 
economic growth and improving living standards in the last thirty years since the 
reform and opening up. Real eatate has become one of pillar industries in China’s 
national economy. 
At the same time,in recent years the development of real estate industry is 
overheated and blind.The market-based regulatory has failed in regulate the market.It 
embodies that the price of real estate continues to climb up. Domestic and foreign 
experience shows that the blind heated development will bring great harm to the 
national economy. Since 2003,the Chinese government have issued a series of 
regulatory policies.However, these regulatory policies are to achieve the effect of 
disappointing. 
I think the problem is not the policy itself,but rather the policy transmission 
mechanism which has been implemented.The central government’s policies are to 
perform by local governments.However,in the macro-control on the real estate 
market,the interests of these two are not uniform,which lead to the inconsistent 
behaviors affects the intensity and effectiveness of policy implementation. 
Through the analysis of the effect of macro-control on the real estate market over 
the years,we found such a phenomenon of mutual game between the central 
government and local government in the implementation of macro-control 
measures.The paper starts from the analysis of the economic and political relations 
between the central and local government, and get a conclusion that the respective 
interests functions is the root cause.The key of game lies in the establishment of game 
rules. Based on the analysis,I have some suggestions to establish an effective regime. 
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